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Why do consumers need advice on how to spend their money to improve their enjoyment of life? Why don't they learn this from daily
experience? We propose that consumers' opportunity to learn from experience is impaired because hedonic experiences are fleeting. Once some
time has passed, consumers rely on their general knowledge to reconstruct what the experience must have been, which is also the knowledge they
use in hedonic prediction and choice. Given this overlap in inputs, prediction, choice and memory usually converge, leaving consumers with the
impression that their predictions were correct and their choices wise. The actual in situ experience, however, may have been quite different. We
illustrate these dynamics with a product many consumers want to spend their money on, namely, a luxury car.
© 2011 Society for Consumer Psychology. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Dunn, Gilbert, and Wilson (2011, p. 2 ms) ask: Given that
money “allows people to do what they please, (…) shouldn't
they be pleased when they spend it?” And if so, shouldn't this
result in a robust relationship between money and hedonic
enjoyment? In contrast to this plausible expectation, decades of
research show that the relationship between income and
subjective well-being is very modest, in particular when we
assess how people feel (that is, their hedonic well-being;
Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, & Stone, 2004, 2006)
rather than how they evaluate their lives (Schwarz & Strack,
1999). Drawing on a broad range of hedonic research, Dunn and
colleagues' (2011) delightful review suggests that money could
do more for our happiness if only we would learn how to spend
it right. Their advice is wise and based on a solid body of
empirical evidence; we hope readers will take it to heart. But the
issue begs another question: Why do we need this advice?
Given that we experience our lives 24/7/365, shouldn't we have
learned what makes us feel good and what does not?⁎ Corresponding author. Fax: +1 734 647 3652.
E-mail address: nschwarz@umich.edu (N. Schwarz).
1057-7408/$ - see front matter © 2011 Society for Consumer Psychology. Publish
doi:10.1016/j.jcps.2011.02.006Learning from hedonic experience
Unfortunately, learning from our feelings is difficult.
Feelings are fleeting and not well represented in memory (for
a review, see Robinson & Clore, 2002). We can introspect on
them while we have them, but once they dissipated, we need to
rely on our memories to reconstruct how we felt. When little
time has passed since the relevant episode, we can draw on
episodic information to “relive” the episode in our mind's eye;
such detailed episodic recall-in-context can recover recent
feelings with some accuracy, as indicated by the convergence of
episodic and concurrent reports (Kahneman et al., 2004; Stone
et al., 2006). But as time passes, relevant details fade from
memory and we are likely to draw on our general knowledge
about the activity to reconstruct what it (must have) felt like.
This general knowledge is also what we turn to when we think
of our “usual” experience, a task that discourages reliance on a
specific episode (Robinson & Clore, 2002). Not surprisingly,
reliance on general knowledge rather than specific episodic
information impairs our ability to learn from specific past
experiences (Ross, 1989). Making things worse, we rely on the
same general inputs when we make hedonic predictions and
contemplate what doing X would feel like if we ever did it.ed by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Table 1







Students 4.53 3.10 1.91 F(2, 170)=70.49, pb .001
N=177
Global recall
Faculty and staff 4.99 4.21 3.38 β=.45, t(89)=4.77, pb .01
N=91
Web survey 4.88 4.19 3.50 β=.38, t(78)=3.52, pb .01
N=80
Episodic recall
Faculty and staff 2.67 2.53 2.31 β=.13, t(76)=1.09, ns
N=78




Web survey 4.83 4.46 3.97 β=.46, t(40)=3.28, pb .01
N=42
Note. Participants reported on the intensity of 10 positive emotions (0=not at all;
6=very much); reports were averaged and higher values indicate more positive
feelings while driving. Students' predictions pertained to BMW, Honda Accord,
or Ford Escort; all other ratings pertained to drivers' own cars and the entries are
estimated means at the Bluebook values corresponding to BMW, Honda
Accord, or Ford Escort. Table adapted from Xu (2007).
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we make within the constraints imposed by our resources, as
March (1978; see also Mellers & McGraw, 2001) noted.
Hence, our predictions of how we would feel while doing X,
global memories of how we usually feel while doing X, and
reconstructions of how we really felt during a distant instance of
doing X are all based on the same inputs—our general
knowledge and intuitions. As one might suspect, given the
overlap of inputs, they nicely converge (Schwarz, Kahneman, &
Xu, 2009). In everyday life, this comforting conversion implies
that our memories confirm the wisdom of our expectations and
choices, which seem to require little revision; in research
situation, the converging observations suggest that the measures
are valid and reliable. Alas, our actual experience in situ may
have been rather different—but unless we considered the
implications of our feelings when we had them, the lessons we
could have learned may be lost.
Next, we illustrate the convergence of predictions and global
memories, and their divergence from recent episodic experi-
ence. We do so with a consumer product that many people
enthusiastically want to spend their money on—a luxury car.
Does it feel better to drive a luxury car?
Almost everyone assumes that driving a luxury car is more
enjoyable than driving an economy car. We asked University of
Michigan undergraduates how intensely they would feel each of
10 positive (e.g., happy, thrilled) or 10 negative (e.g., depressed,
frustrated) emotions while driving a BMW, a Honda Accord, or
a Ford Escort (on a scale from 0=not at all to 6=very much).
Consistent with widely shared intuitions, they expected that the
intensity of positive feelings increases with the value of the car,
whereas the intensity of negative feelings decreases; the first
row of Table 1 shows their predictions of positive affect. The
second and third rows show that students' predictions are
consistent with drivers' global retrospective reports of how they
usually feel while driving their cars. Specifically, we asked
University of Michigan faculty and staff (second row) and
participants in a web survey (third row) which car they drive
(brand, model, and year) and, subsequently, how they “usually”
feel while driving it; they answered on the same affect scales
along which students made their predictions. Next, we used (the
natural log of) the cars' Kelley Bluebook values as an indicator
of car quality and tested whether car quality was a significant
predictor of drivers' reported emotions. Apparently confirming
everybody's intuitions, the drivers reported more positive
emotions the more valuable their car was. Table 1 shows the
estimated mean scores for drivers' positive affect while driving
cars corresponding to the Bluebook values of a BMW, Honda
Accord, or Ford Escort and the corresponding regression
analysis treating car value as a continuous variable. In short, the
students' hedonic predictions seem right on target, even though
many of them may never have driven the cars they made
predictions about.
But as theoretically predicted, episodic reports of the drivers'
experience paint a different picture. In the episodic reporting
conditions, we asked university faculty and staff to recall theirmost recent commute to work (that is, an episode from the same
day) and to report how they felt during that specific episode of
driving. Only after they had reported their feelings, did we ask
them what car they drove. In this case, the quality of the car
driven, as indexed by (the natural log of) its Bluebook value,
was thoroughly unrelated to the drivers' affective experience, as
shown in the fourth row of Table 1. Similarly, we asked
participants in the episodic reporting conditions of the web
survey to recall the last time they drove their car for 20 min or
more and to indicate the nature of this trip before they reported
how they felt during this specific episode of driving. Only after
they had reported their feelings, did we ask them what car they
drove. Again, the quality of the car driven was unrelated to the
drivers' affective experience, a shown in the fifth row of
Table 1.
In sum, students predicted that driving a luxury car feels better
than driving an economy car and drivers' global reports of how
they usually feel while driving their cars “confirmed” this
prediction. However, episodic assessments of how drivers felt
during a recent specific instance of driving their cars revealed no
difference in hedonic experience; according to their episodic
reports, drivers felt just as good in an economy car as in a luxury
car. In combination, these findings make a simple but important
point: The car matters when the car is on the driver'smind, but not
otherwise. When asked to report how they usually feel while
driving their car, drivers think about their car to arrive at an
answer. This is also what others do when asked to predict the
driver's feelings, resulting in the observed convergence of
students' predictions and drivers' global reports. In both cases,
the positive attributes of luxury cars result in higher reports of
expected or experienced positive affect; other aspects of the
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pressing concerns, receive little attention. If consumers followed
Dunn and colleagues' (2011, p. 18 ms) wise recommendation to
“think about what you're not thinking about” they might notice,
although attempts to correct for focusing effects have rarely been
successful (see Ubel, Loewenstein, & Jepson, 2005; Ubel,
Loewenstein, Schwarz, & Smith, 2005). In situ, however, the
driver's experience is quite different. While driving, the driver's
mind is preoccupied with the mundane issues of daily life and the
attributes of the car make little difference, as seen in drivers'
episodic reports. Instead, the driver's feelings depend on what the
driver attends to at the moment, which are often things related to
the purpose of the trip—driving to a leisure event (M=3.08), for
example, feels better than commuting to work (M=2.11), t(52)=
3.40, pb .01 (data from the web sample, row 5).
That our feelings depend on what we attend to (e.g.,
Kahneman et al., 2004, 2006) is one of the reasons why
experiential purchases have more impact on our feelings than
nonexperiential ones (e.g., Van Boven & Gilovich, 2003), as
Dunn and colleagues (2011) emphasize. The whole point of an
experiential purchase is to have an experience, increasing the
likelihood that we attend to it. This logic also predicts that the
car should make a difference when the car is on the driver's
mind, that is, in car-focused episodes. In our web survey, such
episodes were very rare and only one respondent reported
“driving just for fun”, that is, an activity that turns a material
possession into a vehicle for experience. Hence, we asked
another group of respondents to think of the last time they were
driving their car just for fun; to reduce episodic recall problems,
only participants for whom less than 1 week had passed since
that episode were included in the analysis. As in the episodic
reports discussed above, participants reported their feelings
before identifying what car they drove. The bottom row of
Table 1 shows the results. As expected on theoretical grounds,
the positive affect reported for these episodes increased with
(the natural log of) the Bluebook value of the car. Thus, during
car focused episodes of driving—like “driving for fun”—
driving a BMW is indeed more fun than driving an Escort; but
most of the time something else is on the driver's mind and the
car itself makes little difference. By the same token, new cars
are indeed likely to be a true source of pleasure—as long as they
are new enough to capture the driver's attention; once they
become familiar, other things will dominate the driver's mind.
Conversely, a stuttering old clunker will be a source of negative
emotions when its unreliability is on the driver's mind, but not
otherwise.
Unfortunately, as drivers, we have no intuitive insight into
these contingencies. Whenever we think about our cars, we are
likely to do just that: think about the car, not about a specific
episode of driving. And once the car is on our mind, features of
the car figure prominently and dominate our judgment. This is
especially the case when we consider spending our money on a
new car and test-drive possible candidates. During the test drive,
our attention is focused on the car and the more luxurious it is,
the better we feel while driving it—this experience is real,
visceral, and compelling. What we miss is one simple thing:
once we have owned the car for a few weeks, other things willbe on our minds while driving and we would feel just as well
driving a cheaper alternative.
The trouble with experiential purchases
Whereas the belief that a luxury car will be an enduring
source of joy may entice consumers to spend their money on the
wrong thing, other beliefs discourage consumers from spending
their money on the right things. Dunn and colleagues (2011, p. 3
ms) advise us to “buy experiences instead of things.” Many
consumers hesitate to do so because things will be around for a
while and have some enduring value, whereas experiences will
soon be history. Hence, under the sway of the Protestant ethic
(Weber, 1958), spending on hedonic enjoyment is often seen as
wasteful and in need of special justification. In fact, American
consumers believe that indulging in pleasure is itself more
enjoyable when they have a good justification for it (e.g., Kivetz
& Simonson, 2002). Paralleling the rationale of the above car
studies, we found in other work (Xu & Schwarz, 2009) that
justifications play a big role in consumers' hedonic predictions
and global memories, but not in their episodic experience.
While contemplating whether they should spend on an
indulgent meal, for example, justifications loom large in
consumers' minds and they predict that a well-justified
indulgence is more enjoyable than a poorly justified one. The
same expectation also guides their global reconstructive
memories, apparently confirming the wisdom of their predic-
tions. But when the indulgent meal is served, their attention is
focused on the pleasures of the moment and they enjoy their
indulgence as much with a reason as without one. Other
findings, pertaining to a broad range of consumption activities,
reiterate the observation that hedonic expectations, memory,
and choice on the one hand, and actual in situ experience on the
other hand, are often poorly related (e.g., Wirtz, Kruger,
Scollon, & Diener, 2003). As Dunn and colleagues' (2011)
review highlights, people spend their money on things that do
not give them as much pleasure as they expect, yet they keep
doing so without revising their expectations.
What to do about it?
We began this commentary by asking: why do we need
psychologists' advice on how to spend our money, instead of
figuring this out from experience? We propose that our chance
to learn from experience is impaired because hedonic
experiences are fleeting (Robinson & Clore, 2002) and not
accessible to introspection once some time has passed. As a
result, we usually rely on our general knowledge to reconstruct
what the experience must have been, as we do in other domains
of autobiographical memory (Ross, 1989). This knowledge is
also what we use to make hedonic predictions, with the
comforting outcome that our memories are likely to confirm that
our predictions were correct and our choices wise. Unfortu-
nately, the in situ experience may have been quite different; but
unless we revisited our predictions in situ, we missed the chance
to learn from the discrepancy. Once again, Dunn et al.'s (2011)
advice is right on target: think about what you're not thinking
145N. Schwarz, J. Xu / Journal of Consumer Psychology 21 (2011) 142–145about and pay attention to the experience of others, not only to
the simulations in your own head.
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